Who makes the worst Bad Kamma:
One
who knows or one who does not know?
M:
I was reading The Questions of King Milinda[1] edited by NKG Mendis and came across
a question on which I would like some clarification:
Pg 68 Question no 25:
Doing Evil Unknowingly:
King Milinda said: "Reverend Nagasena, for whom
is the greater demerit: he who does an evil deed knowingly or he who does an evil
deed unknowingly?"
"His is the greater demerit, sire, who does an
evil deed unknowingly."
"Well then, revered sir, do we doubly punish
any of our family or our court who does an evil deed unknowingly?"
"What
do you think about this, sire? If a man should unknowingly take hold of a red-hot
ball of iron, glowing with heat, and another should take hold of it knowingly,
which would be more severely burnt?"
"He who took hold of it unknowingly,
sire, would be more severely burnt."
"Even so, sire, the greater
demerit is this who does an evil deed unknowingly"
"You are dexterous,
revered Nagasena."
In the above example, he who took unknowingly would
indeed be burnt more severely.
As I see it, unknowingly here is used in the
sense "without knowledge that the ball is hot" rather than "without
intention to hold." Intention is clearly there but the knowledge that the
ball is hot is absent.
Wouldn't it be more appropriate the other way around
in other kammas? I mean, when I know that 5 precepts laid down for the lay people
are evil and I still indulge in them shouldn't my result be more severe than someone
who doesn't know that they are evil?
For example, Muslims are required by their
religion to slaughter animals in a prescribed manner for their consumption if
they cannot buy halal (as it is called) meat in the market. So shouldn't their
result be less severe as compared to someone who kills animals for pleasure?
I
don't know how appropriate is it to give an example of other religion but laws
of dhamma are the same for people of all the religions.
To deal with the last
issue first: Here, where we are trying to investigate the truth of things it is
appropriate to compare the Buddha's Dhamma with any perceived truth out there.
We are not trying to impose our conclusions on anyone else. And, of course if
we arrive at a conclusion that we can reasonably think will cause conflict with
another group, there is no need to bring it up unasked.
On King Milinda's question:
I
would have answered: Great King! Imagine a still calm pool of clear water. Then
imagine tossing a stone into that water. Would there be ripples?
There would
be ripples.
In fact, there would be no way to act on that water without disturbing
the molecules at least on some level.
The amount of Disturbance the observer
would see in that water would depend on three factors:
The Force with which
the Disturbance was Created;
The Mechanism used for Creating that Disturbance;
and
the Attributes of the Boundaries of the Pond.
A large stone, Thrown
with violent force, into a shallow small pond would not produce the same observed
disturbance as would a small stone, slipped gently into the water of a large pond.
And
in both these cases the disturbance would be the same whether the person doing
the throwing was unknowning of the mechanisms or not, is that not the case?
In
the same way, The Kamma, the rebound [the force] of an intentional act of body,
word-thought-and-speech, or mind, depends on the power of the actor, the power
of the deed, and the power of the recipient of the deed.
The Power of an individual
is proportional to the objective detachment of the individual [An individual who
is not completely detached is holding bias in a certain direction; holding bias
in one direction is maintaining opposition to the forces of the other direction;
maintaining opposition to forces of any sort diminishes Power. -- You might think
of the recipient as being either hard surfaced or sponge like: the rebound off
the hard surfaced individual (one who had no clinging or bias) would be greater
than that of the sponge like individual (one who had clinging or bias)]; Deeds
assume their importance to the degree which they conduce to objective detachment.
And these factors are at work whether the individual is aware of it or not.
The
Subjective Experience of a kammic rebound (whether it is felt as pleasant, unpleasant,
or neither pleasant nor unpleasant) depends on the intent with which the deed
was done. One intends to do an act which causes pain; one intends to do an act
which causes pleasure; or one intends to do an act which brings kamma to an end;
this intent can originate with the individual or with another individual; (and
there are acts which are mixtures of intent).
This allows for the possibility
that the consequences of a forceful bad act done by a weak individual with intent
to cause harm to a powerful individual could be experienced at a later time, by
that same individual who has made himself powerful, as an insignificant unpleasant
sensation (as well as other variations).
Therefore on many grounds neither
is Milinda's question nor is Nagasana's answer well formed.
For instance, Nagasana's
example may in fact be wrong. It may be that an individual, knowing that the coals
are hot panics and actually grips the coal more tightly than would be advised
while the individual ignorant of the condition might well act instinctively and
with greater speed.
Kamma is not a one-dimensional law.
In your example
we would need to know much more to give a proper answer. Suppose more of the variables
were equal. Suppose the two men were equally situated in all ways except that
the one was familiar with and approved of the idea of kamma and the other was
ignorant of the concept. Both have the intent to inflict harm on the goat. The
deed is the same; the goat will not suffer less because one man is aware of kamma
and the other is not. But in the case of the man who is aware of kamma, the possibility
exists that insight occurs subsequent to the deed and in time for compensatory
measures to be taken (for example, building up a great storehouse of good kamma,
or, the Buddhist solution: to so cultivate the mind as to have escaped kamma altogether
as in the state of being Arahatta -- kamma manifests it's consequences in body,
sense experience, perception, in what is perceived as "one's own", and
in consciousness; if none of these things are perceived as "The Self"
or "One's Own" then one has escaped the kammic rebound).[2] In this
case, he who was unknowing suffers more. . . but not as a result of the kamma
of the original act, but because of subsequent kamma.
But Nagasana's statement:
"His is the greater demerit, sire, who does an evil deed unknowingly"
implies that this is the case in every case and that is not an aspect of Kamma.
He has, as you suggest, apparently mixed together the concepts of knowledge and
intent.
Again, we have the case of a man intending to provide a meal to further
the life of a powerful individual. But unknown to this individual, the meal has
become contaminated by food poisoning. Here, because the intent was to cause good,
the kammic rebound is not only not bad, but will have a good outcome. (If the
powerful man is ignorant and assumes harmful intent and punishes his benefactor,
the punishment experienced by the food giver must be attributed to a previous
act of bad kamma, not this good deed).
But take the same case with the added
factor that the individual involved is ignorant of the workings of kamma and he
might well experience remorse and regret and grieve and lament and in other ways
inflict pain on himself. Not only will his remorse and so forth be experienced
as pain, but because he has inflicted these things on himself he creates additional
bad kamma!
On the King's part, he assumes too much (as do most kings) in assuming
the role of the force of kamma in suggesting he doubly punish unknowing offenders,
and will only effectively be doubling his own bad kamma (unknowingly I presume)
-- as you pointed out: kamma is a force of nature, it is not a matter of beliefs
or laws. Kamma is a matter between the individual and himself: it is initiated
by one's own acts and is experienced by one's self alone in accordance with the
variety of factors just discussed.
§
V: In the above, in the situation
of the case of a man intending to provide a meal to further the life of a powerful
individual. But unknown to this individual, the meal has become contaminated by
food poisoning, with the added factor that the individual involved is ignorant
of the workings of Kamma and experiences remorse and regret and grieves and laments
and in other ways inflicts pain on himself. Is it to be understood that in order
for a person to avoid additional bad Kamma, one should not feel bad for doing
bad, once having done a bad deed?
Take the example of three people who go fishing.
Person
A has no idea that when he puts the worm on the hook (injuring and potentially
killing the worm) that this act is bad Kamma or that when he hooks the fish and
kills it, this is also bad kamma.
Person B is aware that when he hooks the
worm, catches and kills the fish, this is bad kamma, but feels no remorse.
Person
C is aware that when he hooks the worm, catches and kills the fish, this is bad
kamma, but does feel remorse.
Which individual has the worst accumulation of
bad kamma coming to him?
In your example A (as unlikely as this would be) if
he had no idea, that this act was causing injury or death (say, imagining that
the worm was rubber?), then he would not even experience the bad kamma from killing
the worm.
In Case B (again, highly unlikely, except in the case of the psychopath),
he experiences the bad kamma from killing the worm but none from inflicting the
pain and discomfort of remorce on himself. (Frankly, I seriously doubt even the
psychopath really avoids remorse; it just takes a form unrecognized by the rest
of us; perhaps displaced in time...time served, that is, in Niraya.)
In case
C he experiences the bad kamma from killing the worm and also from inflicting
remorce on himself.
Just to anticipate: he "inflicts remorce" on
himself by knowingly acting in a harmful way, knowing he will feel remorse therafter.
My point in drawing a distinction between the bad kamma from an injurious act
and the bad kamma from the remorse is not to suggest that there is a way to cause
deliberate injury and slip passed without a care, it is to point out the unnecessary
suffering inflicted on one's self when one assumes unwarranted guilt. The advantage,
for one who knows that remorse is a separate and distinct instance of bad kamma
is in the ability to make use of its presence to act quickly to learn the act
that caused it and to immediately train one's self to abstain from such a thing
in the future, or, should one discover in such an examination that (as in, say
the case of the food poisoning) there was no way to avoid the act that caused
the remorse it should immediately occur to one who understood this distinction
that there was a possibility that there was no guilty act involved -- that one
was under some sort of dilusion.
What we need to keep in mind, thinking about
kamma is that kamma did not result from morality, morality results from theories
about kamma. Kamma is strictly a law of physics. Intentional action producing
subjective experience. Where there is no intent there is no reaction to be subjectively
experienced. Once kamma has been reformulated into morality, it assumes a power
of it's own (bad ditthi, low view), and then acts involving wrong intent are possible
(for example: assuming guilt for an act that does not warrant it).
H: So would
I be correct in connecting the idea of Kamma with that of emptiness? -- You said
that by placing guilt upon the self, one is causing suffering thus causing bad
kamma. This suffering has its root, mula, in the connection of the event with
the self, saying it was 'I' or 'me' who caused the bad thing to happen. Just as
in the concept of emptiness where one views emotions that arise in the here and
now objectively. In stead of connecting this emotion to the self or to another
person one simply watches and views the emotion as it begins, remains, and ends.
The Kamma produced by fealing guilt is a result of the connection of the result
of the bad action with the self, saying 'I did it.' Instead, one should see the
bad action and view it objectively and not involve oneself in its beginning, middle,
or ending. Learning from that action and realizing the Kamma that was inherent
in it, then adjusting the behavior accordingly to avoid such things from happening
again.
In broad terms, kamma is what is obstructing emptiness, so yes.
Kamma
is in it's essential nature a subjective thing, so it is correct to say that the
root of Kamma is identification with kamma-producing action. (I am sure you realize
that it is not just saying "I did it" that causes identification with
an action.)
When you speak of watching as emotions arise, persist, and end,
I believe you are drawing from the technique described in the Satipatthana, not
the technique described in the Emptiness sutta. Not a bad thing to do, just a
matter of technical detail; the "Emptiness" method is one of using concentration
on ever more narrowly defined (or more refined) constructs to "empty"
the mind of broader ones.
The kamma is not caused by the feeling of the guilt
or remorse, it is caused by knowingly doing a wrong action. The remorse is the
rebound. I drew a distinction between the kamma that caused remorse and the kamma
that caused injury in order to show how it was possible to create false remorse
based on incorrect understanding. Said another way: it is possible to cause remorse
in one's self without having a good reason for the remorse; but it is not possible
to cause intentional injury without causing one's self remorse. That said, your
statement that this (experience) is a result of the connection of the result of
the bad action with the self is correct, and the method you describe of objective
evaluation is good technique.
Then I think we can go a little further with
this: A person who intentionally committed an injurious act would be bringing
remorse upon themselves. But what is often the case is that a person will add
to that remorse unnecessarily, stimulating tears and lamentation and creating
all kinds of ruckus. All of that is unnecessary editorializing on the fact and
is a creation of false remorse on top of real remorse. The energy would have been
much more productively devoted to this objective examining you suggest. Take your
punishment like a man and learn from it...something like that.
H: I am a little
fuzzy on the distinction you made about the emptiness sutta and the idea of viewing
things objectively as they arise, remain, and conclude. You said: '"Emptiness"
method is one of using concentration on ever more narrowly defined (or more refined)
constructs to "empty" the mind of broader ones.'
And in his essay,
Thanissaro Bhikkhu said:
"If, however, you can adopt the emptiness mode
-- by not acting on or reacting to the anger, but simply watching it as a series
of events, in and of themselves -- you can see that the anger is empty of anything
worth identifying with or possessing . . . When you see this, you realize that
labels of "I" and "mine" are inappropriate, unnecessary, and
cause nothing but stress and pain. You can then drop them. When you drop them
totally, you discover a mode of experience that lies deeper still, one that's
totally free. . . . To master the emptiness mode of perception requires training
in firm virtue, concentration, and discernment. Without this training, the mind
tends to stay in the mode that keeps creating stories and world views."
It
would seem that, just like the leg muscle attachment thing[3], that involvement
in the concentration with, lets say, the noise of the city surrounding Migara's
Mother's castle is infinitely more attached to the world than the concentration
on only the castle itself. This new view is totally void of the perception of
the noise that is coming from the city surrounding the castle. This process continues
on up, continuing to narrow the scope of perception, and at a certain level one
is perceiving only the manner in which things come into being, persist in existing,
and then come to an end.
As I understand it, in the same way does the Kamma
of a situation become evident when one limits his view to merely viewing the occurrence
as it begins, persists, and then ends. This detachment is achieved by the following
of the Aristocratic Multidimensional Way, freeing ones perception of the low views,
low works, low talk, low . . . ya know. The Aristocratic Multidimensional Way
is the emptying of ones life of superfluous behavior, thought, and speech that
are downbound to the world of pain and suffering.
Bringing my point back to
the topic above, I see the connecting of the self to such downbound feelings such
as superfluous guilt as the broadening of ones perception of these things, the
opposite of emptying it. This involvement, or indulging, in the suffering is the
cause of the bad Kamma that arises from not behaving in accordance with the reality
of the situation, in accordance with the Aristocratic Multidimensional Way.
What
is your opinion on this connection?
Your understanding actually seems remarkably
free of fuzz!
Your contrasting of the emptiness technique and the satipatthana
technique is accurate I see nothing amiss in this method you are developing for
your practice. This is exactly as it should be. You are taking a bit from here
that works for you and a bit from there that works for you; and I believe that
is how it should be done.
V: What
if (hypothetically) one did not think (ie. it never occurred to them) that what
they were doing was wrong? I'm thinking of my example of "pulling weeds"
as killing living things. I would guess that most people don't give it a second
thought. Would these people therefore, have caused no bad kamma for themselves,
because of their ignorance? Is ignorance of harm equivalent to "no intent"
to harm?
In the case of it not even occuring to one that one is doing harm,
there is no kamma. This must be understood to be being said in the absolutest
of hypothetical terms. I say that because what constitutes knowing and intent
can be very subtle...to the point of near-unconsciousness. (One would need to
be aware that one was "killing the weeds," for example; that is what
one set out to do; and it is hard to pull weeds and not see some of the disruption
one is causing such creatures as worms, etc.)
On the other hand we also have
cases in the suttas where it is pointed out that merely by walking one is injuring
countless living beings but that because there is no deliberate intent to injure
there is no kamma involved. Here you have a case where there is knowledge and
yet there is no kamma because there is no intent.
The murkey ground comes in
in cases like building a fire. The Bhikkhus do not make fire except in extreme
situations. This is because it is understood that fire kills countless living
beings just by burning. So there is some gray area there between doing a necessary
deed that injures living beings as being done without intent to harm and doing
the same deed when it is unnecessary as implying intent to harm and therefore
causing bad kamma.
While I am of the opinion that this kind of thinking, thinking
in ethical terms, is a very high form of thinking for one in the world, we must
remember that the objective here is the escape from all kamma. Consequently, the
fine details of how kamma works should not be the highest priority on our list
of things to be thought about. We need to understand the mechanism of action in
terms of how it applies to rebirth: the intentional doing of a deed (any deed),
grounded in desire, carries intent that implies identification with the deed and
consequently downbinds the individual to the outcome of the deed in one form or
another in the future. You can take it in the form of gross outcome spread out
over long periods of time, or you can expend energy here and now in the effort
to get beyond kammic outcomes. We do need to understand that it is intent that
is the mechanism of action because without that factor being critical to the subjective
experience of kamma, there could be no escape from kamma for individuals.
I
think we need to remember the simile for the way we should think about food. On
the one hand we should act with compassion and regard for all living creatures
seen or unseen. On the other hand we need to accept the fact that simply by opting
to live in the world we are bringing down harm on innumerable living beings and
a whole heap of bad kamma on ourselves. We want to vigerously train ourselves
to abstain from the gross deeds of killing large animals and humans, theft, and
telling lies and we want to be stearing our lives towards that time when we give
up the world in order to rid ourselves of the remaining bad deeds, but we should
not be obsessing about the unavoidable.
V:
This is an excerpt from "The Way to the End of Suffering" by Bhikkhu
Bodhi regarding the definition of "taking of life" which he says only
pertains to "sentient beings" thereby excluding plants.
Abstaining
from the taking of life (panatipata veramani)
Herein someone avoids the taking
of life and abstains from it. Without stick or sword, conscientious, full of sympathy,
he is desirous of the welfare of all sentient beings.
"Abstaining from
taking life" has a wider application than simply refraining from killing
other human beings. The precept enjoins abstaining from killing any sentient being.
A "sentient being" (pani, satta) is a living being endowed with mind
or consciousness; for practical purposes, this means human beings, animals, and
insects. Plants are not considered to be sentient beings; though they exhibit
some degree of sensitivity, they lack full-fledged consciousness, the defining
attribute of a sentient being.
First we must distinguish between "precept"
and "kamma".
The Precepts are "Training Precepts". They
do a "good enough" job to get you started, but they do not pretend to
mirror kamma. For a mirror of kamma one needs to look to the Magga. (In this discussion
Bhikkhu Bhodhi is not making the distinction between the two very clear.)
Even
so, the Precept tells us:
"Train yourself to abstain from harm to living
beings"
P¤¼¤tip¤ta: p¤¼a: breathing
thing; atip¤ta: at tack, a pat (PED goes quickly from attack to murder;
I am suggesting this goes to far too fast and includes every injurious act: i.e.:
harm.) Plants breath.
The Magga makes the situation absolutely clear by the
use of the word: avihi¸sa (a=no; vihi¸sa, do you hear the violinsa?
absense of violence, harm, cruelty.)
Kamma has no period of training, for one.
But I am not sure (actually I am completely without doubt) about the limited definition
given to living beings mentioned by Bhikkhu Bodhi for the precepts. In quite a
large number of places throughout the suttas you will find injury to plant and
seed "life" coming under the scope of that harm to living beings which
should be abstained from. (For just one such reference, check out the section
on Mere Morality of the Brahmajala Sutta of the Digha Nikaya. -- The first sutta
of the Long Discourses of the Buddha right up front after the introductory materials)
In many places plants are referenced as "beings of one sense" (touch).
Secondly,
I do not see in the concepts of "pani" or "satta" the idea
of "sentience" as excluding plants. (I think satta may have a more exclusively
animal implication); there is even less ground to exclude plants if we use the
word sentient, a thing that senses. I have seen with my own eyes, a plant that
"sensed" it was on it's side, using water pressure to attempt to right
itself; I saw it attempt, I saw it get tired, and I saw it rest, and I saw it
attempt again, over and over until it succeeded. Many peoples will tell you that
plants speak to them. When this is said it uses the term "speech" incorrectly,
but there is no easy way to explain what is happening: one is being "shown"
pictures and connections to thoughts are being made.
PS: I also think Bhikkhu
Bhodi has misunderstood the following:
He states: "Each principle embedded
in the precepts, as we will see, actually has two aspects, both essential to the
training as a whole. One is abstinence from the unwholesome, the other commitment
to the wholesome; the former is called "avoidance" (varitta) and the
latter "performance" (caritta)."
A careful examination of what
is intended by the idea of cultivating the good will be found to be the development
of states that are also characterized by abstinence, giving up, letting go, not
doing: "without wanting, dislike, and blindness". Essentially the idea
is spelled out in Samma Vayama:
Stop doing bad things you currently are doing
Refrain
from starting up new bad things
Keep on with habits that you currently have
that involve not doing bad
Develop habits that you currently do not have that
involve not doing bad
I cannot stress enough that it is not possible to attain
Nibbana where doing is required. The system absolutely depends on the fact that
there is no bad kamma from any act of not doing. Similarly, there is no good kamma
required: we are trying to get above, beyond kamma here; this is not done, in
it's essence, by way of kamma . . . but . . . please understand, I fully agree
with the idea that beginners should first set out to create a nice savings account
of good kamma as a fall back position!.
[1]The
Questions of King Milinda, while held to be orthodox Theravada texts, are not
the word of the Buddha. For the most part Nagasana does not even claim that he
is repeating the word of the Buddha. And that is a good thing, because he is often
off the mark.
[2]Reference the similes of the salt in the barrel of water and
the rich man and the poor man who both steal pigs. See: ThePaliLine - Giving.
[3]See:
DhammaTalk: Sitting Practice: Leg Muscles and Attachment.
.