The Taste of Freedom
By Bhikkhu Bodhi
The clarion call of our present age is, without doubt, the call for freedom. Perhaps
at no time in the past history of mankind so much as at present has the cry for
freedom sounded so widely and so urgently, perhaps never before has it penetrated
so deeply into the fabric of human existence.
In response to man's quest for freedom, far-reaching changes have been wrought
in almost every sphere of his activity -- political, social, cultural and religious.
The vast empires which once sprawled over the earth, engulfing like huge mythical
sea-monsters the continents in their grasp, have crumbled away and disintegrated,
as the peoples over whom they reigned have risen up to repossess their native
lands -- in the name of independence, liberty and self-rule.
Old political forms such as monarchy and oligarchy have given way to democracy
-- government by the people -- because every man demands the right to contribute
his voice to the direction of his collective life. Long-standing social institutions
which kept man enthralled since before the dawn of history -- slavery, serfdom,
the caste-system -- have now disappeared, or are rapidly disappearing, while accounts
of liberation movements of one sort or another daily deck the headlines of our
newspapers and crowd the pages of our popular journals.
The arts, too, bear testimony to this quest for greater freedom: free verse in
poetry, abstract expression in painting, and atonal composition in music, are
just a few of the innovations which have toppled restrictive traditional structures
to give the artist open space in his drive for self-expression. Even religion
has not been able to claim immunity from this expanding frontier of liberation.
No longer can systems of belief and codes of conduct justify themselves, as in
the past, on the grounds that they are commanded by God, sanctified by scripture,
or prescribed by the priesthood. They must now be prepared to stand out in the
open, shorn of their veils of sanctity, exposed to the critical thrust of the
contemporary thinker who assumes himself the right to free inquiry and takes his
own reason and experience for his court of final appeal. Freedom of speech, freedom
of the press, and freedom of action have become the watchwords of our public life,
freedom of thought and freedom of conscience the watchwords of our private life.
In any form in which it obtains, freedom is guarded as our most precious possession,
more valuable than life itself. "Give me liberty or give me death,"
an American patriot exclaimed two hundred years ago. The succeeding centuries
have echoed his demand.
As though in response to mankind's call for wider frontiers of freedom, the Buddha
offers to the world His Teaching, the Dhamma, as a pathway to liberation as applicable
today as it was when first proclaimed twenty-five centuries ago.
"Just as in the great ocean there is but one taste -- the taste of salt --
so in this Doctrine and Discipline (dhammavinaya) there is but one taste -- the
taste of freedom": with these words the Buddha vouches for the emancipating
quality of His doctrine.
Whether one samples water taken from the surface of the ocean, or from its middling
region, or from its depths, the taste of the water is in every case the same --
the taste of salt. And again, whether one drinks but a thimble-full of ocean water,
or a glass-full, or a bucket-full, the same salty taste is present throughout.
Analogously with the Buddha's Teaching, a single flavor -- the flavor of freedom
(vimuttirasa) -- pervades the entire Doctrine and Discipline, from its beginning
to its end, from its gentle surface to its unfathomable depths. Whether one samples
the Dhamma at its more elementary level -- in the practice of generosity and moral
discipline, in acts of devotion and piety, in conduct governed by reverence, courtesy,
and loving-kindness; or at its intermediate level -- in the taintless supra-mundane
knowledge and deliverance realized by the liberated saint, in every case the taste
is the same -- the taste of freedom.
If one practices the Dhamma to a limited extent, leading a house-hold life in
accordance with righteous principles, then one experiences in return a limited
measure of freedom; if one practices the Dhamma to a fuller extent, going forth
into the homeless state of monk hood, dwelling in seclusion adorned with the virtues
of a recluse, contemplating the rise and fall of all conditioned things, then
one experiences a fuller measure of freedom; and if one practices the Dhamma to
its consummation, realizing in this present life the goal of final deliverance,
then one experiences a freedom that is measureless.
At every level the flavor of the Teaching is of a single nature, the flavor of
freedom. It is only the degree to which this flavor is enjoyed that differs, and
the difference in degree is precisely proportional to the extent of one's practice.
Practice a little Dhamma and one reaps a little freedom, practice abundant Dhamma
and one reaps abundant freedom. The Dhamma brings its own reward of freedom, always
with the exactness of scientific law.
Since the Dhamma proposes to provide a freedom as complete and perfect as any
the modern world might envisage, a fundamental congruence appears to obtain between
man's aspiration for expanding horizons of liberty and the possibilities he might
realize through the practice of the Buddha's Teaching. Nevertheless, despite this
concordance of ends, when our contemporaries first encounter the Dhamma they often
find themselves confronted at the outset by one particular feature which, clashing
with their familiar modes of thought, strikes them intellectually as a contradiction
and emotionally as a stumbling block. This is the fact that while the Dhamma purports
to be a pathway to liberation, a Teaching pervaded throughout by `the taste of
freedom,' it yet requires from its followers the practice of a regimen that seems
the very antithesis of freedom -- a regimen built upon discipline, restraint,
and self-control. "On the one hand we seek freedom," our contemporaries
object, "and on the other we are told that to reach this freedom our deeds,
words, and thoughts must be curbed and controlled." What are we to make of
this astonishing thesis the Buddha's Teaching appears to advance: that to achieve
freedom, freedom must be curtailed? Can freedom as an end really be achieved by
means that involve the very denial of freedom?
The solution to this seeming paradox lies in the distinction between two kinds
of freedom -- between freedom as license and freedom as spiritual autonomy. Contemporary
man, for the most part, identifies freedom with license. For him, freedom means
the license to pursue undisturbed his impulses, passions and whims. To be free,
he believes, he must be at liberty to do whatever he wants, to say whatever he
wants and to think whatever he wants. Every restriction laid upon this license
he sees as an encroachment upon his freedom; hence a practical regimen calling
for restraint of deed, word, and thought, for discipline and self-control, strikes
him as a form of bondage. But the freedom spoken of in the Buddha's Teaching is
not the same as license. The freedom to which the Buddha points is spiritual freedom
-- an inward autonomy of the mind which follows upon the destruction of the defilements,
manifests itself in an emancipation from the mould of impulsive and compulsive
patterns of behavior, and culminates in final deliverance from samsára,
the round of repeated birth and death.
In contrast to license, spiritual freedom cannot be acquired by external means.
It can only be attained inwardly, through a course of training requiring the renunciation
of passion and impulse in the interest of a higher end. The spiritual autonomy
that emerges from this struggle is the ultimate triumph over all confinement and
self-limitation; but the victory can never be achieved without conforming to the
requirements of the contest -- requirements that include restraint, control, discipline
and, as the final price, the surrender of self-assertive desire.
In order to bring this notion of freedom into clearer focus, let us approach it
via its opposite condition, the state of bondage, and begin by considering a case
of extreme physical confinement. Suppose there is a man locked away in a prison,
in a cell with dense stonewalls and sturdy steel bars. He is tied to a chair --
his wrists bound together by rope behind his back, his feet locked in shackles,
his eyes covered by a blindfold and his mouth by a gag. Suppose that one day the
rope is unfastened, the shackles loosened, the blindfold and gag removed. Now
the man is at liberty to move about the cell, to stretch his limbs, to speak,
and to see. But though at first he might imagine that he is free, it would not
take him long to realize that true freedom is still as distant as the clear blue
sky beyond the stoned and steel bars of his cell.
But suppose, next, that we release the man from prison, set him up as a middle-class
householder, and restore to him his full body of rights as a citizen of the state.
Now he can enjoy the social and political freedom he lacked as a prisoner; he
can vote, work, and travel as he likes, can even hold public office. But there
still remains -- in the form of his responsibilities, his burden of duties, his
limitations of power, pleasure, and prestige -- a painful discrepancy between
the freedom of mastery for which he might personally yearn, and the actuality
of the situation which circumstances has doled out to him as his drearisome lot.
So let us, as a further step, lift our man up from this middle-class routine,
and install him, to his pleasant surprise upon the throne of a world monarch,
a universal emperor exercising sovereignty over all the earth. Let us place him
in a magnificent palace, surrounded by a hundred wives more beautiful than lotus-flowers,
possessed of limitless resources of gold, land, and gems, endowed with the most
sublime pleasures of the five senses. All power is his, all enjoyment, fame, glory,
and wealth. He needs only express his will for it to be taken as command, need
only utter a wish for it to be translated into deed. No obstruction to his freedom
of license remains. But still the question stands: is he truly free? Let us consider
the issue at a deeper level.
Three kinds of feelings have been pointed out by the Buddha: pleasant feeling,
painful feeling, and neutral feeling, i.e., feeling which is neither pleasant
nor painful. These three classes exhaust the totality of feeling, and one feeling
of one class must be present on any given occasion of experience. Again, three
mental factors have been singled out by the Buddha as the subjective counterparts
of the three classes of feeling and described by him as anusaya, latent tendencies
which have been lying dormant in the subconscious mental continua of sentient
beings since beginning-less time, always ready to crop up into a state of manifestation
when an appropriate stimulus is encountered, and to subside again into the state
of dormancy when the impact of the stimulus has worn off.
These three mental factors are lust (raga), repugnance (patigha), and ignorance
(avijja), psychological equivalents of the unwholesome roots of greed (lobha),
hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha). When a worldling, with a mind untrained in
the higher course of mental discipline taught by the Buddha, experiences a pleasant
feeling, then the latent tendency to lust springs up in response -- a desire to
possess and enjoy the object serving as stimulus for the pleasant feeling. When
a worldling experiences a painful feeling, then the latent tendency to repugnance
comes into play, an aversion towards the cause of the pain. And when a worldling
experiences a neutral feeling, then the latent tendency to ignorance -- present
but recessive on occasions of lust and aversion -- rises to prominence, shrouding
the worldling's consciousness in a cloak of dull apathy.
On whatever occasion the three latent tendencies to lust, repugnance, and ignorance
are provoked by their corresponding feelings from their dormant condition into
a state of activity, if a man does not make an effort to dispel them, does not
strive to restrain, remove, and abandon them and bring them to naught, then they
will persist in consciousness. If, as they persist in consciousness, he repeatedly
yields to them, endorses them, and continues to cling to them, they will gather
momentum, come to growth, and like a ball of flame flung upon a haystack, flare
up from their initial phase as feeble impulses into powerful obsessions which
usurp from a man his capacity for self-control. Then, even if a man be, like our
hypothetical subject, an emperor over the earth, he is inwardly no longer his
own master but a servant at the bidding of his own defilements of mind.
Under the dominance of lust he is drawn to the pleasant, under the dominance of
hate he is repelled by the painful, under the dominance of delusion he is confused
by the neutral. He is bent up by happiness, bent down by sorrow, elated by gain,
honor, and praise, dejected by loss, dishonor, and blame. Even though he perceives
that a particular course of action can lead only to his harm, he is powerless
to avoid it; even though he knows that an alternative course of action is clearly
to his advantage, he is unable to pursue it. Swept on by the current of un-abandoned
defilements, he is driven from existence to existence through the ocean of samsára,
with its waves of birth and death, its whirlpools of misery and despair. Outwardly,
he may be a ruler over all the world, but in the court of consciousness he is
still a prisoner. In terms of license he may be completely free, but in terms
of spiritual autonomy he remains a victim of bondage in its most desperate form:
bondage to the workings of a defiled mind.
Spiritual freedom, as the opposite of this condition of bondage, must therefore
mean freedom from lust, hatred, and delusion. When lust, hatred, and delusion
are abandoned in a man, cut off at the root so that they no longer remain even
in latent form, then a man finds for himself a seat of autonomy from which he
can never be dethroned, a position of mastery from which he can never be shaken.
Even though he be a mendicant gathering his alms from house to house, he is still
a king; even though he be locked behind bars of steel, he is inwardly free. He
is now sovereign over his own mind, and as such over the whole universe; for nothing
in the universe can take from him that deliverance of heart, which is his inalienable
possession. He dwells in the world among the things of the world, yet stands in
perfect poise above the world's ebb and flow. If pleasant objects come within
range of his perception he does not yearn for them, if painful objects come into
range he does not recoil from them. He looks upon both with equanimity and notes
their rise and fall. Towards the pairs of opposites, which keep the world in rotation
he is without concern, the cycle of attraction and repulsion he has broken at
its base. A lump of gold and a lump of clay are to his eyes the same; praise and
scorn are to his ears empty sounds. He abides in the freedom he has won through
long and disciplined effort. He is free from suffering, for with the defilements
uprooted no more can sorrow or grief fall upon his heart; there remains only that
perfect bliss unsullied by any trace of craving.
He is free from fear, from the chill of anxiety, which even kings know in their
palaces, protected by bodyguards inside and out. And he is free from disease,
from the sickness of the passions vexing and feverish that tie the mind in knots,
from the sickness of samsára with its rounds of defilement, action, and
result. He passes his days in peace, pervading the world with a mind of boundless
compassion, enjoying the bliss of emancipation, or teaching fellow way-farers
the path he himself has followed to the goal, in the calm certain knowledge that
for him the beginning-less trail of repeated births and deaths has been brought
to a close, that he has reached the pinnacle of holiness and effected the cessation
of all future becoming.
In its fullness, the freedom to which the Buddha points as the goal of His Teaching
can only be enjoyed by him who has made the realization of the goal a matter of
his own living experience. But just as salt lends its taste to whatever food it
is used to season, so does the taste of freedom pervade the entire range of the
Doctrine and Discipline proclaimed by the Buddha, its beginning, its middle, and
its end. Whatever our degree of progress may be in the practice of the Dhamma,
to that extent may the taste of freedom be enjoyed. It must always be borne in
mind, however, that true freedom -- the inward autonomy of the mind -- does not
descend as a gift of grace. It can only be won by the practice of the path to
freedom, the Noble Eightfold Path.
